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Abstract 
Information provision, choice simplification, social messaging, active-choice frameworks, and automatic 
enrollment all increase retirement savings. However, gauging the relative efficacy of these approaches is 
challenging because the supporting evidence derives from diverse populations over a long period. In this 
study, we leverage experimental and quasi-experimental variation in a constant setting, the U.S. military, to 
examine the effects of nearly two dozen experiments for four leading policy options (i.e., information 
emails, action steps, target contribution rates, active choice, and automatic enrollment) designed to 
increase retirement savings. Consistent with the previous literature, we find sizable effects on 
participation and cumulative contributions that increase with the intensity of the intervention. We then 
exploit cost data to complete the first cost-effectiveness analysis in the literature. Our analysis suggests 
that active choice programs are the most cost-effective method to generate new program participation 
and contributions for small, medium, and large firms, while automatic enrollment is more cost-effective 
for very large firms. 
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1. Evaluating the Relative Effectiveness of Retirement Savings Programs 
A majority of Americans who are approaching retirement age have little to no money 
saved for retirement.1 Over the past two decades, however,  behavioral researchers have 
explored a variety  of potential “nudges” designed to increase savings including active choice 
(Carroll et al., 2009), automatic enrollment (Madrian and Shea, 2001, Choi et al., 2006, 2004), 
automatic escalation (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), behaviorally informed messaging (Benartzi et 
al. 2017, Choi et al., 2017; Goda, Manchester and Sojourner, 2014), simplified enrollment 
options (Beshears et al. 2013), and actionable education (Skimmyhorn, 2016).  This work has 
been at the forefront of the broader behavioral economic and financial literature (Madrian 2014, 
Madrian et al. 2017), and it has been especially influential on national level policies (Beshears et 
al. 2009).  See Beshears et al. (2018) for a review.     
Validating, comparing, and potentially selecting from among these different 
approaches is difficult for two reasons.  First, existing studies differ significantly in their 
samples (e.g., demographics), firm characteristics, study periods, and outcomes—each of 
which can meaningfully alter the impact of the policy intervention. As a result, while extant 
research documents impactful policies in disparate samples, it remains unclear which 
policies are most effective.  Ideally, a researcher could create direct comparisons between 
interventions by randomly assigning individuals from a large population to each of these 
approaches at the same time. In this study, we take advantage of a setting that nearly 
replicates this ideal framework. 
Second, the existing literature has very little to say about the cost-effectiveness of 
various policies.  Benartzi et al. (2017) note that despite relatively small absolute effects, 
“nudges” may be more cost-effective than traditional policies such as tax incentives in a 
variety of policy domains including retirement savings, but “more calculations are needed to 
determine the relative effectiveness of nudging.”  Yet to our knowledge, there is no evidence 
on the relative cost-effectiveness of widely varying behavioral policies to encourage 
retirement savings.  We study a setting that affords the use of cost data to inform policy 
choices under budget constraints. 
                                                            
1 Morrissey (2016) finds that that the medium U.S. family with a head of household aged 56-61 only has $17,000 in 
retirement account savings and that fewer than 50% of Black and Hispanic households have any retirement account 
savings.  Jeszeck et al. (2015) document similar statistics in their GAO report. 
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In this study, we examine the relative efficacy and cost-effectiveness of four leading 
policy options designed to promote retirement savings: behaviorally informed messaging, 
provision of target retirement savings rates, active choice enrollment, and automatic enrollment.  
We leverage two randomized field experiments and two natural experiments at one of the 
nation’s largest employers (the U.S. Army) that exploit the largest samples to date (i.e., varying 
from approximately n=29,000 to n=164,000), that afford the use of high-quality administrative 
data and that rely on very similar workplace conditions.  Without doubt, our sample is unique 
relative to the full working population, both in firm and employee characteristics.  However, 
both of these features may prove to be strengths.  The relatively homogenous nature of the 
Army’s locations and work requirements strengthen our ability to hold constant the institutional 
setting.  Our sample is younger, lower tenure, moderately educated, and with lower incomes than 
the full U.S. population, but these characteristics may reflect more closely the population of 
interest for retirement savings interventions (i.e., the lower tail of the savings distribution who 
are unlikely to save on their own, see e.g., Thaler and Benartzi (2004), Carroll et al. (2009), 
Madrian (2014)).2  Taken together, these features enable us to hold constant the institutional 
setting and produce new and comparable estimates of program effects and cost-effectiveness. 
In our main estimates that use a sample of new (i.e., first-term) servicemembers, we find 
that light-touch email interventions (i.e., information, action steps, and contribution rate targets) 
increase voluntary Thrift Savings Program (TSP) contributions by 0.2-0.7 percentage points (pp) 
relative to a control group (6-9% effect sizes), and the latter two behavioral interventions are 
sometimes distinguishable from information alone.  Programs that involve additional individual 
interactions (i.e., active choice) increase contributions by an additional order of magnitude, 
nearly 11pp (104%), and they are distinguishable from the control group and all of the light 
touch interventions.  Automatic enrollment has much larger effects of 37pp (208%), which are 
statistically different from the other programs.  We observe similar effects sizes and patterns 
when we analyze the effects on contribution rates, and cumulative contributions.  In Appendix B, 
we analyze a larger sample that includes new servicemembers and those with more tenure and 
                                                            
2 The military is also a sample of independent interest given the role of the all-volunteer force in the nation’s 
security, its own federally mandated compensation and pension plans, and previous national-level commissions 
(e.g., the Hook Commission of 1948, the Zwick Commission of 1978, and the most recent Military Retirement and 
Modernization Commission of 2015) and programs (e.g., the Uniformed Services Retirement Modernization Act of 
1974, policy changes in multiple National Defense Authorization Acts, and most recently, the Blended Retirement 
System) focused on military compensation and servicemember welfare.   
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find similar results.  Overall, our results follow our intuition and validate the existing literature, 
which establishes that effect sizes grow in magnitude with the intensity of the intervention. 
Our cost-effectiveness analysis provides new and straightforward evidence on retirement 
savings policies for firms facing cost constraints.  Our results suggest that active choice 
programs are the most cost-effective method for small, medium, and large firms to generate new 
program participation (typically around $11 for a new participant) or savings (and around $0.01 
for a new dollar of contributions).  Automatic enrollment, however, is the most cost-effective for 
very large firms, including the organization we study (the Department of Defense), who can 
amortize the implementation costs over larger numbers.  The critical values for firm size when 
automatic enrollment becomes more cost-effective varies (from n=1,717 to n=12,749) based the 
outcome of interest and on assumptions about program costs.   
Our paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we review the retirement savings literature and 
identify our contributions.  We discuss our institutional setting and the four experiments we 
analyze in Section 3, and we summarize the data in Section 4.  We present our results on 
program effectiveness in Section 5 and cost-effectiveness in Section 6.  In Section 7, we 
conclude. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Our paper contributes primarily to the retirement savings literature, but also to the wider 
behavioral economics literature and the scientific literature on the value of replication.  For 
simplicity, we focus our review of the retirement savings interventions primarily on new 
enrollments, and we classify these interventions into three categories: information nudges, active 
choice, and automatic enrollment.3 
Information nudges include a large number of light-touch interventions that encourage 
retirement savings via information provision.  These interventions might be traditional (e.g., a 
program benefits brochure or email) but are more frequently “behavioral” in leveraging 
psychological insights related to salience, simplification, reminders, and/or suggestions.  The 
cues studied by Choi et al. (2017) have no statistically significant effect on participation or 
contributions, except for low target anchors reducing contribution rates (1.15pp, 41%) 
                                                            
3 Some scholars use the term “nudge” to describe virtually all “behavioral” (or non-traditional) interventions. See, 
for example, Thaler and Sunstein (2008). 
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approximately six months after implementation.  Benartzi et al. (2017) study the effects of 
various messaging approaches including language related to framing, action steps, interest rate 
clarifications and tax savings salience.  Their interventions increased both program enrollment 
(0.72pp, 66% effect magnitude) and contribution amounts ($1.94), but the analysis only extends 
to one month after implementation.  We study this same program and outcomes in a similar 
setting, and we are able to do so at longer horizons.  In a slightly different program, Choi et al. 
(2009) and Beshears et al. (2013) study the effects of Quick Enrollment, which provides an 
employee with a pre-selected contribution rate and asset allocation.  This program increased 
participation rates (15-20pp) and contribution rates (0.5pp).  Similarly, Goldin et al. (2017) show 
that providing target contribution rates to military servicemembers increases enrollment (0.64pp, 
33% effect magnitude) and contribution rates (0.05pp, 33% effect magnitude) after one month.  
We expand on their work by extending the analysis horizon in a similar setting.  In related work, 
the Office of Evaluation Science (2017) finds no effects of a 5% rate prompt on employee 
contributions at or above this rate for Department of Treasury employees.   
Active choice programs promote retirement savings by encouraging (or requiring) employees 
to make retirement savings decisions related to contribution rate(s) and asset allocations, often 
during onboarding processes.  Carroll et al. (2009) estimate large effects for these programs on 
the participation margin (23pp, 43% effect magnitudes) and contribution rates (1.3pp, 35% effect 
magnitudes) one year after implementation.  In related work, Skimmyhorn (2016) shows that 
“actionable education,” which combines financial education with enrollment assistance (e.g., 
distributing enrollment forms, answering questions, and collecting and submitting forms) has 
even larger effects on participation (15pp, 125% effect magnitude) and average monthly 
contributions ($19.93, 115% effect magnitude). 
Finally, under automatic enrollment programs, an employer defaults individuals into 
participating in the firm’s retirement savings plan.  Studies on automatic enrollment document 
extremely large effects on individual decisions.  Madrian and Shea (2001) find that automatic 
enrollment significantly increases participation (50pp, 135%) and contribution rates (1.14pp, 
43% effect magnitude) for employees after 3-15 months.   Choi et al. (2004) find very similar 
effects on participation (45-56pp, 90-144% effect magnitude) after 12 months but smaller effects 
on contribution rates (-0.19-0.55pp, -9-17% effect magnitudes) at the longer outcome horizons 
up to 35 months. 
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While there exists an impressive body of research on “behavioral” strategies to increase 
retirement savings, our review identifies some important limitations that the current research 
hopes to address.  First, existing studies vary widely by firm type (e.g., technology to finance to 
military), participant demographics (e.g., gender imbalance, non-representative incomes), 
institutional features (e.g., matching), and time periods (i.e., from 1997-2016).  These differences 
leave unanswered the generalizability of any specific study’s findings to other settings.  We are 
able to evaluate the effects of multiple interventions in a more constant setting. 
Second, previous studies have estimated program effects on different outcomes (i.e., 
participation rates, contribution rates, and contribution amounts) and at different time horizons 
(e.g., 1 month through several years).  We have attempted to mitigate some of the latter 
differences by reporting estimates from a reasonable and constant time horizon (6 months) in 
existing studies when possible.  Nonetheless, assessing program effects across these outcomes 
proves difficult without better information on the full distribution of contribution rates (including 
non-participants) and incomes within each firm/study.  Attempting to rank order the 
effectiveness of programs proves even more difficult as it requires detailed data on the precision 
of estimates throughout the distributions, which is often unavailable in published studies or 
supplementary results.  In the present study, we will estimate program effects on the same 
outcomes for the maximum feasible horizon (6 months), and we will consistently test for 
differential effects across treatments. 
Third, and importantly, there is virtually no cost data or cost-effectiveness analysis in any of 
the published studies.  One notable exception is Benartzi et al. (2017) who provide the first 
rigorous cost-effectiveness analysis of traditional policies (e.g., tax incentives, information) vs. a 
single behavioral policy (e.g., nudges).  They also conclude that more work should focus on the 
cost-effectiveness of different nudge policies.  We include in our study a scientific replication of 
their results and additional cost-effectiveness analyses to provide more insight into optimal 
policy selection with respect to retirement savings. 
Nonetheless, several review articles identify important themes from this line of research.  
Beshears et al. (2008) review the research related to default options and suggest that a 
combination of reduced complexity (defaults simplify and decouple decisions), procrastination, 
and an endorsement effect drive the large effects.  Choi et al. (2004) review the effects of both 
behavioral and more traditional methods on 401(k) decisions, and conclude that individuals often 
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follow the ‘path of least resistance.’  In addition to their empirical results cited above, Carroll et 
al. (2009) develop a model of retirement savings plan enrollment decisions.  Their results suggest 
that active choice may be optimal in settings with procrastination and/or heterogeneous savings 
preferences, while default enrollment may be optimal in settings with low financial literacy.  
This optimality relies on aggregated individual utility functions but ignores the effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness of the policies.  Madrian (2014) argues that behavioral findings related to the 
role of psychological biases (on retirement savings and elsewhere) motivate expanded thinking 
about market failures, and revised thinking about the effectiveness of traditional policy tools.  
She identifies one motivation for our current work, noting, “the academic literature has given 
little consideration to what constitutes an optimal default” (p.670).  Similarly, Madrian et al. 
(2017) document the effects of “systematic psychological tendencies” and identify a number of 
behavioral approaches that have or may increase retirement savings (e.g., simplification, active 
decision-making, behaviorally informed messages), but the review leaves unanswered which 
approaches are the most effective and cost-effective.  Their work highlights the value of research 
such as ours, noting that experiments and pilot programs within the federal government have 
significant potential to help our scientific understanding of the relative efficacy of different 
policies and to serve as a model for wider adoption in public and private employment settings.   
We conclude our summary by noting that a common goal of all these reviews, and the 
underlying body of experimental research discussed above, is to improve policy design.  We 
share this goal and believe that our ability to estimate and then compare leading interventions 
quantitatively, both in their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, can improve policy responses 
related to retirement savings. 
 
3. Background on Retirement Savings Interventions 
Our setting exploits experimental and quasi-experimental variation in enrollment policies 
generated by deliberate randomized controlled trials or differential policy exposure in the 
world’s largest defined-contribution (DC) retirement savings plan.4  From April 2015 through 
January 2018, the White House Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (WHSBST), the 
                                                            
4 As of December 31, 2018, the TSP had nearly $559B in assets under management.  See the 2018 annual report at: 
https://www.frtib.gov/ReadingRoom/FinStmts/TSP-FS-Dec2018.pdf.  For additional information on the TSP and its 
size, see: https://www.tsp.gov/thirty/. 
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Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of the Army (DA) implemented four 
experimental interventions designed to increase military servicemembers' contributions to their 
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) retirement account, their employer-sponsored retirement account akin 
to a 401(k) for most employees.5  The TSP offers tax-advantaged (traditional or Roth) savings in 
a variety of low-cost index investment funds (i.e., government securities, fixed-income, common 
stock (US large cap), US small cap stock, international stock, and lifecycle target-date funds that 
combine the five primary funds).  Military servicemembers are also eligible for a defined benefit 
(DB) retirement, which was cliff-vested at 20 years of service prior to January 1, 2018, and has 
since expanded to a blended system with DC and DB components.6 
Previous reports (Benartzi et al. 2017, Goldin et al. 2017, Office of Evaluation Science 
2015a, 2015b) suggest that these interventions can yield reliable estimates of the program 
effects, and we analyze the effects among active-duty military servicemembers in the U.S. 
Army.7  In our primary analysis, we rely on a sample of new servicemembers (i.e., serving in 
their first voluntary enlistment term) to maximize the comparability of our estimates across 
programs.  We describe each intervention below and summarize the combined samples in Table 
1.  The samples we study are young (mean age is 23), mostly male (85%), racially and ethnically 
diverse (e.g., approximately 22% Black and 16% Hispanic), and moderately educated (e.g., a 
modal education level of high school graduate, but 17% with more than a high school degree).  
Their annual income is approximately $35,000 per year, and individual basic pay, used to 
compute retirement savings contributions, accounts for approximately 64% ($22,476) of the 
total.8  We summarize the samples by control and treatment status for each intervention in Table 
2.  We observe balance across characteristics within each intervention and similarity across 
interventions as well.  In Appendix B, we include more tenured servicemembers, which increases 
                                                            
5 The TSP serves as the employer-provided defined contribution plan for federal employees, including military 
servicemembers.  For more information, see https://www.tsp.gov/PDF/formspubs/tspbk08.pdf. 
6 For a summary of the new blended retirement system (BRS), see: 
https://militarypay.defense.gov/Portals/3/Documents/BlendedRetirementDocuments/A%20Guide%20to%20the%20
Uniformed%20Services%20BRS%20December%202017.pdf?ver=2017-12-18-140805-343  
7 The first two interventions were conducted across all four military services (i.e., Air Force, Army, Navy, and 
Marine Corps), but we focus our analysis on the Army based on data limitations, and to ensure greater comparability 
of our estimates with the interventions 3 and 4.   
8 Military compensation consists of several components including pay (basic, special, and incentive) and allowances.  
We observe and compute an estimated total pay (annual income) as the sum of the largest of these components: 
basic pay (which varies by rank and tenure), basic allowance for housing (BAH, which varies by rank, dependent 
status and location), and basic allowance for subsistence (BAS, which varies by officer/enlisted status).  See: 
https://militarypay.defense.gov/Pay/ for more information. 
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our sample sizes and the demographic representativeness of our sample, but which reduces the 
comparability across settings, since the more tenured individuals were selected only among 
previous non-savers (i.e., negatively selected).  The results are quantitatively and qualitatively 
similar, as all of our estimates from the larger sample fall within the 95% confidence intervals 
from our main estimates, though the effect sizes are slightly larger since the control group means 
are typically smaller for the sample that includes more individuals who had previously chosen 
not to save in the TSP.   
 
3.1 Intervention 1: Behavioral Messaging 
The first of these interventions is a randomized controlled trial (RCT) conducted by the 
WHSBST, the DOD, and Benartzi et al. (2017). This study randomly assigned 806,861 
servicemembers across the Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy who were not contributing to 
their TSP retirement to one of 10 groups based on the last two digits of their Social Security 
number (SSN). These groups, as detailed in Appendix C, include (a) a control group that 
received no email, (b) a group that received a standard TSP information email with text from the 
TSP website and no explicit behavioral nudges (hereafter, the Information Email group),9 and (c) 
eight groups that received a behaviorally motivated email message that presents the contribution 
choice in three simple steps (hereafter, the Action Steps group).  
These action steps include (1) logging into the linked military payroll website, (2) 
clicking on the link to “Traditional TSP and Roth TSP” contributions, and (3) entering and 
submitting the percentage of pay that a servicemember wants to contribute to TSP. In seven of 
the action steps groups, action steps are paired with some combination of “fresh start” 
framing, “active choice” framing, “inertia” framing, and “interest rate clarification.” In 
practice, we do not find any significant differences in savings outcomes across the different 
action steps treatments in our sample.10  We proceed by pooling the action-steps treatments 
                                                            
9 The Information Email group received an email (found in Appendix C, group B) that included a brief description 
of the TSP program, described where to sign up for the TSP, and provided a link for more information. Table 1 
columns 1-2 compare the characteristics of those assigned to the control group and Information Email group.  While 
a joint test across treatments is marginally significant (p=0.07), estimates of the effects of the Information Email 
(not shown) are unaffected by the inclusion of demographic controls. Furthermore, demographic characteristics in 
the full Army sample balance across control and Information Email treatments (p=0.49; Appendix B Table 1, 
columns 1 & 2), suggesting that randomization was implemented correctly.        
10 One possible explanation for the lack of differences across all of these treatments is that the action steps appear to 
be the most visually distinct aspect of each of these email messages.  As a result, the action steps may dominate a 
reader’s attention in each version of the action steps email. 
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into one group in our primary analyses of first-term servicemembers.  Randomized 
treatment (confirmed in columns 3-4 of Table 2) enables straightforward ordinary least 
squares estimates of program effects.   
 
3.2 Intervention 2: Savings Rate Prompts 
In January of 2016, the WHSBST and DOD conducted another large-scale email-based RCT that 
tested the effect of action-steps emails and rate-prompt emails:  messages that informed 
servicemembers that other servicemembers were contributing a certain percentage or more of 
their basic pay to their TSP accounts.11  Researchers randomly assigned 699,674 
servicemembers across the Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy who were not contributing 
to their TSP retirement to one of 10 groups based on the last two digits of their SSN. These 
groups, detailed in Appendix C, include (a) a control group that received no email, (b) an 
email with identical action steps to those sent in the April 2015 intervention, and (c) one of 
eight “rate prompt” emails.  In each of the rate prompt emails, the servicemember received 
an email with action steps and the following message: “MANY SERVICEMEMBERS LIKE 
YOU START BY CONTRIBUTING AT LEAST X% OF THEIR BASIC PAY INTO A 
TRADITIONAL OR ROTH TSP ACCOUNT.”  In these emails, 𝑋𝑋 takes on a value between 1 
and 8, based on the last two digits of a servicemembers’ Social Security number.  In our primary 
analysis, we pool all the rate prompt emails for simplicity and our estimates can be 
approximately interpreted as the effect of receiving an email with a target contribution rate equal 
to 4.5% compared to receiving no email.12  As with the first intervention, we validate the random 
assignment (columns 5-6 of Table 2) and estimate program effects using ordinary least squares 
estimates. 
 
3.3 Intervention 3: Active Choice 
In the third intervention, the WHSBST, along with the DOD and US Army, conducted an 
active choice intervention in the spring of 2016, where newly arriving servicemembers at two 
                                                            
11 Goldin et al. (2017) and Goldin et al. (2019) analyze this experiment and document the effects of different 
contribution rate nudges on savings plan participation and contribution rates.  We do not replicate their work here, 
and instead analyze the average effect of the contribution rate nudges to compare this policy with other behavioral 
approaches.  
12 In untabulated results, we replicate the findings of Goldin et al. (2017). 
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military installations (Fort Bragg, NC, and Fort Lewis, WA) were required to make a choice 
whether or not they would begin contributing to their TSP account. At Fort Lewis, all 
servicemembers arriving between March 14 and April 8 attended an in-processing meeting in 
which servicemembers were asked to raise their hand if they wanted to begin contributing to the 
TSP. Those who raised their hands were immediately taken to computers where they were able 
to enroll in the TSP. At Fort Bragg, servicemembers were required to complete a modified TSP 
election form, which included a choice between three options: (1) “Yes, I choose to enroll and 
save,” (2) “No I choose not to enroll and save,” or (3) “I’m already enrolled.” Although these   
two interventions implement active choice in slightly different ways, we combine both methods 
in our primary analyses.13  We analyze this intervention using a difference-in-differences 
approach that compares the differences in contribution decisions for new servicemembers at 
these two bases before and after the intervention compared to those of new servicemembers at 
other bases before and after the intervention.  We provide summary statistics for the control and 
treatment groups in Table 2 (columns 7-8) and note the similarity between groups in their 
demographic characteristics.  
 
3.4 Intervention 4: Automatic Enrollment  
In January of 2018, the Department of Defense (including the Army) implemented 
automatic enrollment in the TSP for all new servicemembers as part of a new military retirement 
system.14  This program changed TSP participation from a default of no TSP contributions (i.e., 
opt-in) with no matching to a default contribution rate of 3% (i.e., opt-out) of their basic pay.15  
Additionally, BRS eligible servicemembers receive a 1% agency automatic contribution 
regardless of whether they contribute.16  An individual’s own contributions, and resulting 
                                                            
13 In untabulated results, we estimate the relative efficacy of the implementations at Fort Lewis and Fort Bragg.   
14 The military changed to a Blended Retirement System (BRS) that included a defined benefit pension (reduced 
relative to the legacy pension system), continuation pay (between 8 and 12 years of service), and a defined 
contribution component in the TSP.  The default contribution rate in the TSP was 3% and applied only to basic pay, 
excluding special pay and other contributions.  This DC plan structure is similar to what federal civilian employees 
receive.  See Beshears et al. (2019) for an analysis of the effects of automatic enrollment on federal civilian 
employees. 
15 Basic pay is the standard pay servicemembers receive each month. Many servicemembers are also eligible for a 
variety of special pays and allowances, depending on location, housing, and occupation. 
16 Two years after entry, servicemembers become eligible for a 100% (i.e., dollar for dollar) match on their first 3% 
of basic pay contributed, and a 50% match on the next 2% of basic pay contributed. We assume that this future 
match does not significantly affect the decision to contribute within the first eight months of Army service, as 
servicemembers can change contribution levels at any time.   
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earnings vest immediately, but the agency automatic contributions only vest after two years 
of service.   
We exploit the sharp timing of the discontinuity at the implementation date (i.e., January 1, 
2018) to estimate the effects of this program using a difference-in-difference approach. 
Specifically, we compare the changes in contributions for new servicemembers entering the 
Army immediately after the BRS system was implemented (January-March 2018) and those 
entering before the BRS (October-December of 2017) to the differences in contributions for new 
individuals between the same months in the previous year (January-March 2017 vs. October-
December 2016).  We note the similarity of demographic characteristics by treatment status in 
Table 2 (columns 9-10) and provide an event study in Figure 1 to support our identification 
assumptions of parallel trends.17 
 
4. Data 
We exploit several, primarily administrative, data sources for our analysis.  To estimate the 
effects of each program, we leverage administrative data from the Army and DOD.  This data 
includes military personnel data (including demographics, location data, and relocation timing 
data), DOD payroll data (including monthly TSP contribution amounts), and TSP account data 
(including quarterly TSP contributions and account balances).     
To estimate the cost-effectiveness of each program, we leverage administrative cost data 
when possible.  We combine the cost data and the program effect estimates to estimate the cost 
of each new enrollment, dividing total costs by the total number of new enrollments.  To our 
knowledge, this enables the largest cost-effectiveness analysis to date in the retirement savings 
literature.  See Appendix A for more details on our cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), including 
sensitivity analysis.   
The light-touch interventions (i.e., information, action steps, and target contribution rates) 
                                                            
17 While the majority of the pre-intervention estimates are statistically indistinguishable for the control and treatment 
groups, two estimates (t=-1 and t=-2) are statistically different.  However, as Figure 2 shows, the samples are 
extremely small for both groups (reflecting few military moves and arrivals just before the New Year), and roughly 
what we would expect by chance.  Moreover, we are reassured by the parallel trends from t=-15 to t=-5 where the 
samples are larger and our estimates are more precise.  We are exploring the points t=1 to t=5 to determine if there 
were implementation issues with the BRS that explain the intermediate enrollment levels. 
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each had a fixed cost of $5,000, related primarily to developing new email content.18  Cost data 
was unavailable for the active choice interventions, but we develop a model of total costs to 
support our cost-effectiveness analysis.  Under reasonable assumptions (i.e., we include the labor 
costs for conducting briefings and collecting forms but omit any new costs for materials since the 
DOD had existing materials related to its retirement programs), the estimated cost is 
approximately 1.20 per person (one hour of labor at $30/hour for each briefing to 25 people).  
We also estimate the costs to implement an automatic enrollment regime based on discussions 
with firms administering retirement plans.  We assume that firms are modifying an existing 
retirement savings plan to include a new default,19 that they pay only a fixed cost of $5,000 for 
the policy change.20  
 
5. Results on Program Effectiveness 
In this section, we present program effect estimates for three retirement savings outcomes.  
For the randomized controlled trials, we provide ordinary least squares estimates of equation 1: 
 
                                                  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                                                   (1) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is an outcome of interest: participation in the TSP, the percentage of basic pay 
contributed to the TSP, or the cumulative TSP contributions.  We measure these outcomes at six 
months after each intervention.  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is the vector of covariates described in Table 2 including age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, number of dependents, education level, and military 
personnel category (officer or enlisted) and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is our error term.  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 indicates 
assignment to one of the retirement savings interventions (i.e., information email, action steps, 
and target contribution rates).  We document valid randomization in Tables 2 and so 𝛽𝛽 reflects 
the causal effect of each program. 
                                                            
18 We obtained cost data from program administrators at the WHSBST and the Office of Evaluation Sciences and 
confirmed it with the former director of the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, which manages the TSP 
and was familiar with these and other similar programs. 
19 Costs for establishing a new employer-provided plan would differ and could be significantly higher. 
20 While firms might pass some or all of these costs on to employees via fees, we still consider them here as a 
marginal cost to an automatic enrollment regime.  While the costs are likely to be small relative to the costs of the 
matching funds, they are non-negligible. We explore different combinations of these fees in our sensitivity analysis. 
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The active choice and automatic enrollment interventions generated differential exposure 
to treatment by location and time, respectively.  For these programs, we estimate difference-in-
differences models:  
     𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖    (2) 
 
Here 𝛽𝛽3 is our coefficient of interest, and given parallel trends (see Figure 1 for the automatic 
enrollment intervention) reflects the effect of each program. 
 
TSP Participation 
We analyze the effects of each intervention on plan participation and provide our results 
in Table 3.  The light-touch email interventions providing information, action steps, and target 
rates (columns 1-3) increase participation by 0.20 percentage points (pp), 0.41pp and 0.69pp, 
respectively, and the latter two estimates for action steps and target rates are statistically 
significant (p<0.05 and p<0.01, respectively).  These estimates represent moderate increases in 
participation rates (6-9%) relative to the control means (7.2% and 7.6%, respectively).  These 
point estimates are not statistically distinguishable from one another, but the differences in their 
magnitudes are suggestive that the behavioral interventions using action steps or target 
contribution rates were the most effective of the light-touch interventions.  This pattern holds for 
our other outcomes, and so we focus on the action steps intervention when referring to the light-
touch interventions in our effectiveness and cost-effectiveness analyses.  Our action step 
estimates (95% CI [0.06pp, 0.76pp]) include the Benartzi et al. (2017) estimates of 0.72pp, 
despite slightly different time horizons (1 month vs. 6 months for ours) and sample (all DOD 
servicemembers vs. Army members for ours).  Our target contribution rate estimates (0.69pp) are 
nearly identical to those of Goldin et al. (0.64pp) despite the same differences. 
The active choice intervention (column 4) increases participation by an order of 
magnitude over these interventions, and by 10.68pp over the control group, a 104% effect that is 
statistically significant (p<0.01).  Our results (95% CI is [6.94pp, 14.4pp]) are slightly smaller 
than Carroll et al. (2009), who estimate an effect of 23pp in a different sample (i.e., with more 
income, tenure, and female employees), and with matching contributions. 
Automatic enrollment (column 5) increases participation even more, by 37.28pp relative 
to the control group, a 208% effect that is an order of magnitude larger than active choice and 
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statistically significant (p<0.01).21  The larger effects are unsurprising given the existing 
literature on the power of defaults.  However, our results (95% CI is [35.9pp, 38.7pp]) are 
slightly smaller than those of Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi et al. (2004) who estimate 
effects from 49pp-50pp. 
Taken together these results suggest that more intensive (and paternalistic) interventions 
increase TSP participation more.  This relationship echoes previous findings in the rank 
orderings, though at slightly lower levels overall.  These differences might arise from our 
younger samples, the absence of matching contributions, and/or the presence of the military’s 
defined benefit pension. 
TSP Contribution Rates 
We estimate treatment effects on individual contribution rates in Table 4.  The 
information email has a small positive effect of 0.0036pp on contribution rates that is statistically 
insignificant.  Action steps and target contribution rates increase the percentage of pay 
contributed by 0.03pp (10%) and 0.04pp (12%), respectively, and these results are statistically 
different from the control group (p<0.01) and marginally different from the information email 
(p=0.060 and p=0.107, respectively).  We forego benchmarking our action steps estimates, as 
few studies analyze this margin.  The 95% CI for our target rate intervention [0.01pp, 0.07pp] 
includes the 0.05pp estimates of Goldin et al. (2017).    
The active choice intervention increased contribution rates by 0.61pp (281%), and the 
estimate is statistically different from the control group and all three low-touch interventions 
(p<0.01).  Our estimate (95% CI [0.37pp, 0.86pp]) is smaller than the 1.3pp estimate of Carroll 
et al. (2009).  As with participation, the program effect magnitudes for contribution rates 
increase with the intensity of the intervention. 
TSP Balances 
We present estimates for cumulative contributions after six months in Table 5.  Providing 
information increases the average contributions after six months by a statistically insignificant 
$2.30, a 5% effect.  Providing action steps and target rates increase cumulative contributions by 
                                                            
21 These estimates are lower bound for the effect of automatic enrollment given that there may have been some 
implementation lags under the BRS (e.g., see Figure 1 and the points from t=1 to t=5). 
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$8.88 (18%) and $10.91 (21%), respectively (p<0.01 for both).  Action steps and target rates are 
once again statistically different from the information email (p<0.05 for both) but not from one 
another. We are unable to compare these estimates to previous studies, as they do not include 
estimates on this outcome.  Our action step estimates (95% CI [$4.19, $13.57]) include our 
adaptation ($11.64) of the Benartzi et al. (2017) estimates.22   
The active choice intervention increases total amounts by $82.61 after six months, an 81% 
effect that is distinguishable from the control group (p<0.01) and the behavioral email 
interventions (p<0.05).  We forego benchmarking these results to Carroll et al. (2009), who do 
not analyze balances.  Finally, automatic enrollment increases accumulated dollars by $138, a 
197% effect that is significantly different from the control group (p<0.01) and from all other 
groups (p<0.01 for the email interventions and p<0.01 from active choice).  Madrian and Shea 
(2001) and Choi et al. (2004) do not estimate program effects on unconditional balances and so 
we are unable to benchmark these results.  Overall though, our contribution results follow the 
participation rate and contribution rate results, increasing in magnitude based on the intensity of 
the intervention. 
 
Heterogeneity of Treatment effects 
We analyze whether each of our treatment effects on TSP participation differ by age, race, 
sex, marital status, and education in Table 6.  Our results suggest several important patterns in 
treatment effectiveness.  First, in columns 1 and 2, we divide our entire sample in half by age.  
Panels A-C show that information email nudges are most effective among older individuals in 
our sample (with point estimates at least twice as large for the older participants as the younger 
participants).23 This may be because young people spend less time on email than older people 
do.24 In contrast, active choice has similar efficacy across age groups and default treatments are 
more effective for younger individuals (p<0.05).   
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, we estimate the efficacy of each treatment for both non-white 
and white individuals in our study. We find that defaults are significantly more effective among 
                                                            
22 Benartzi et al. (2017) estimate an effect of $1.94 after 1 month.  $1.94 x 6 months = $11.64. 
23 Differences in participation by younger and older are statistically insignificant for the baseline treatment 
(p=0.384) and action stems (p=0.15), but significant for rate prompts (p<0.05).  
24 See, for example, Perez (2016), NTIA (2018) and Pew (2010). 
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non-white individuals in our sample (p<0.01).  Otherwise, we observe no meaningful differences 
in treatment effects by race.   
While we do not find any differences in treatment effects by sex for any of the information 
nudges, we do find differences in the effects of active choice and default treatments by sex in 
columns 5 and 6 of Table 6.  In particular, we find that women are more than twice as likely to 
respond to an active choice treatment as men are (p<0.10), whereas men are 27% more likely to 
be affected by automatic enrollment treatment than women are.   
  In columns 7 and 8 of Table 6, we examine how the effects of each behavioral intervention 
varies by marital status.  In general, we find similar patterns to our divisions by age, which may 
be unsurprising given the correlation between age and marital status in our sample (older 
individuals in our sample are nearly three times as likely to be married as younger individuals). 
The differences by marital status are not significant for any of the information nudges or for 
active choice, but we find that unmarried individuals are more responsive to defaults (p<0.05).  
Finally, in columns 9 and 10 of Table 6, we compare the responsiveness to treatments by 
education status. In each of our email nudge treatments, we find that those with at least some 
college experience are much more likely to respond. The baseline treatment effects for those 
with more education are large but statistically insignificant, but the Action Steps and Target Rate 
treatments increase participation by approximately an order of magnitude for these individuals 
(p<0.05 and p=<0.01, respectively). Active Choice also has a larger effect for those with more 
education (p<0.05).  In contrast, we find that those with no college experience are more than 
twice as likely to be affected by defaults than those with at least some college experience (effects 
of 40.23 and 19.47 percentage points, respectively: p<0.01).   
The differences we observe by age, sex, and education across programs highlight how the 
effectiveness of behavioral interventions might vary by context.  They also clarify the 
importance of holding the context and population constant when comparing the efficacy of 
different programs designed to increase retirement savings.    
 
6. Results on Cost-Effectiveness 
We estimate the cost-effectiveness for each policy 𝑗𝑗 using the total program costs and total 
new enrollments according to equation 3:  
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                                                           (3) 
Where the total cost to implement the program (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗) is a function of fixed (e.g., content 
development costs) and variable (e.g., per person administrative fees) costs.  𝛽𝛽𝚥𝚥�  is the point 
estimate for intervention 𝑗𝑗 on TSP participation, and 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 is the respective sample size.  In our 
main specifications, the light touch email interventions and automatic enrollment have fixed 
costs equal to $5,000.  Active choice costs are variable but its cost-effectiveness proves to be a 
constant value.  In Appendix A, we derive the cost-effectiveness functions for each intervention, 
which enable us to determine the most cost-effective programs (i.e., minimum cost per new 
enrollment or cost per dollar of new contributions) for any firm size.  We estimate these 
measures for four different firm sizes: small (n=25), medium (n=750),25 large (n=1,000) and the 
Department of Defense (n=800,000), and present our results in Table 7. 
   
Cost Per New Enrollment 
Panel A results depict the estimated costs for each new enrollment in the TSP for each of 
the interventions.  For example, automatic enrollment (column 5) costs $5,000 to implement and 
it increases enrollment by 0.3728pp.  For a small firm (n=25), this generates 9.32 enrollments 
and the cost per new enrollment is, therefore, $5,000/9.32 = $536.  Note also that the nature of 
the program costs simplifies our comparisons significantly.  Since automatic enrollment has the 
same total costs ($5,000) as the light-touch interventions but much larger effects on enrollment 
(Table 2), it is always more cost-effective than these interventions.26  Specifically, the estimates 
in column 5 are always lower than the estimates in columns 1-3.  This enables us to focus on 
comparing the cost-effectiveness measures for automatic enrollment and active choice.   
Our main estimates suggest that active choice is more cost-effective than automatic 
enrollment for small, medium, and large firms, at a cost of $11.24 per new enrollment.  
However, automatic enrollment becomes more effective for very large firms like the Department 
of Defense who can amortize the fixed costs over a large number of employees.  For a firm of 
                                                            
25 According to the Census Longitudinal Business Database in 2014, the medium employee works at a firm with 
500-999 employees.  We use the midpoint of this range (n=750) as our medium firm size.  
26 This result would hold for any level of equal fixed costs or equal marginal costs (e.g., an outreach fee) across 
these programs.  For the light touch interventions to be more cost-effective, one or both of these costs would have to 
be significantly higher for automatic enrollment. 
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this size, automatic enrollment generates a new enrollment for approximately 4 cents.  We 
compute the critical value for the firm size by equating the cost functions for these two programs 
and estimate that active choice is the most cost-effective policy for firms smaller than n*=1,194 
employees and automatic enrollment is more cost-effective for firms larger than this size.27 28  It 
is also worth noting that the light-touch interventions also become more cost-effective than 
active choice for very large firms, but they never outperform automatic enrollment given our 
data on costs. 
 
Cost Per Dollar Contributed 
In Panel B of Table 7, we complete a similar cost-effectiveness analysis for the average 
individual cumulative TSP contributions after six months.  Qualitatively, our results for new 
contributions are similar to those for new enrollments.  In our baseline scenario, active choice 
(column 4) remains the most cost-effective for small, medium and large firms, who can generate 
a dollar of contributions for $0.01.29  Automatic enrollment (column 5) is more cost-effective for 
very large firms like the Department of Defense, which can generate a dollar of contributions for 
$0.0001.  Here the critical value for firm size is n*=2,490 employees.30 31 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We conduct a number of alternative analyses to determine how sensitive the main cost-
effectiveness results are to our assumptions about the nature and level of costs in Appendix 
Tables A2 and A3.  Given that automatic enrollment dominates the light-touch interventions, 
these analyses focus on changes to the costs of automatic enrollment and active choice programs.  
We adjust the underlying costs to the active choice upwards and downwards by 50% to account 










= 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  ;𝑇𝑇∗ = 1194.67 
28 Census data from the Longitudinal Business Database in 2014 suggests that there are 10,869 firms with more than 
1,000 employees, and this is an upper bound on how many firms might prefer active choice to target contribution 
rates given the critical value for firm size, n*=1,195.  This constitutes 0.21% of firms but up to 46.3% of employees. 
29 Our main effect and cost-effectiveness estimates for the action steps intervention are nearly identical to those in 











= 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴;𝑇𝑇∗ = 2,498.55 
31 Census data from the Longitudinal Business Database in 2014 suggests that there are 4,946 firms with more than 
2,500 employees, representing 0.1% of firms but up to 39.20% of employees. 
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for changes to program capacity and/or labor costs.  Increasing the capacity by 50% (or reducing 
the costs by this amount) increases the cost-effectiveness of active choice and makes it cost-
effective for more firms at $6 per new enrollment and $0.0073 per dollar of contributions (with 
critical values of n*=2,398 and n*=4,979, respectively).  Conversely, reducing the capacity by 
50% (or increasing the costs by this amount) decreases the cost-effectiveness of active choice 
and makes it cost-effective for more firms at $7 per new enrollment and $0.0218 per dollar of 
contributions (with critical values of n*=796 and n*=1,660, respectively).  Finally, since 
automatic enrollment might require additional notifications or other marginal costs to implement, 
we add marginal costs ($30) to automatic enrollment, which makes active choice more cost-
effective for firms of any size for both outcomes.32  Overall, our analysis suggests that active 
choice is always the most cost-effective policy for small, medium and large firms and that 
automatic enrollment is the most cost-effective choice for very large firms, with the critical 
values ranging from n=796 to n=4,979 depending on the assumptions surrounding costs. 
 
7. Discussion 
We analyze the relative efficacy of leading policies designed to increase retirement savings 
in employer-provided plans.  While there exists a large literature on potential strategies, choosing 
from these approaches is hard since the studies have differed significantly in their settings.  In 
this study, we hold the institutional setting constant and study several leading programs in the 
U.S. Army.  We find sizable effects on participation for emails with action steps or target 
contribution rates (around 6-9%), larger effect sizes for active choice enrollment (91%), and 
even larger effect sizes for automatic enrollment (over 200%).  Our results on contribution rates 
and cumulative contributions are similar in the magnitudes and relationship with the intensity of 
the behavioral intervention.  Together, our results provide several lessons.  First, they provide 
large-scale rigorous validation of existing estimates, which arose from widely disparate settings.  
In this way they serve as a large-scale scientific replication of much of the existing literature on 
retirement savings interventions, a unique contribution in economics (Hammermesh 2007) 
despite the established value of such efforts (Nichols 2017, Hammermesh 2016). 
                                                            
32 Given the cost functions, automatic enrollment will only be more cost-effective than active choice for large firms 
when the marginal costs remain less than $11 (for new enrollments) and $0.01 (for new contributions). 
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Second, taken together, our estimates suggest that behavioral interventions, even light touch 
emails, generally outperform traditional approaches that provide information alone.  In addition, 
in all cases, our estimated effect magnitudes appear to increase with the “behavioral” intensity of 
the intervention: defaults generate larger effects than active choice, which generates larger 
effects than behavioral messaging.  These lessons, developed while holding constant the 
institutional setting, further validate policy approaches designed to leverage lessons from 
psychology. 
The reasons for non-savings are large (e.g., procrastination, limited attention), they may 
interact, and they may require different policies to address them (Carroll et al. 2009).  Identifying 
these mechanisms is another line of research worthy of study to develop optimal policy 
responses, though our setting is not well suited to evaluate the impact of any specific 
mechanisms.  Instead, our setting enables a unique and experimental comparison of several 
leading policy choices, and we document the importance of considering program costs in 
addition to program effects.  
  Our cost-effectiveness analysis provides unique evidence to the existing literature.  Our 
results suggest that active choice is the most cost-effective program for small, medium and large 
firms and that automatic enrollment is the most cost-effective for very large firms, including the 
Department of Defense, the organization from which our study derives.  In addition to our main 
estimates, we conduct a variety of sensitivity analyses that support this conclusion, and we 
demonstrate a method (following and extending Benartzi et al. (2017)) for firms or other 
organizations to estimate their own cost-effectiveness measures in support of retirement savings 
plan design. 
Our sample of first-term uniformed servicemembers differs from the full working population 
in several ways. Most notably, members are younger, more often male, and they have a narrower 
distribution of education levels.  While we control for these observable characteristics and 
conduct heterogeneous treatment analyses, our sample may still differ from the population of 
interest in unobservable ways.  To expand our analysis to a more representative sample, we 
analyze a second sample in Appendix B that includes servicemembers of all tenure levels. 33  Our 
                                                            
33 Our second sample (Appendix B) derives from individuals’ previous non-participation in the TSP, which was the 
selection criteria for the WHSBST and DOD interventions.  These individuals are likely to be less receptive to any 
given retirement savings intervention, and they may have received multiple treatments during their service.  This 
concern does not apply to our main analysis of first-term servicemembers.  In untabulated results, we augment our 
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results are very similar to the main analysis, with the same signs and values that fall within the 
original 95% confidence intervals.  This analysis leverages a larger and more demographically 
representative sample, though it is still non-representative.  To further address this concern, we 
completed detailed benchmarking of our results to the current literature and note that in most 
cases, our effect estimates are comparable to those from non-military settings.  Moreover, 
existing studies also took place in very unique settings with variability in firm types, sample 
demographics (e.g., gender imbalance, high salary firms), and over a two-decade period.  
Relative to this literature, we are able to estimate causal program effects for several leading 
policies while holding the institutional setting nearly constant.  Given that a primary objective of 
this research is a relative comparison of policies, we know of no reason that the relative rankings 
of these policies should vary in different samples even if the effect levels might.  While we have 
extended and replicated a robust literature on choice architecture, further study is required to 
estimate the full effects of enrollment policies (e.g., active choice, automatic enrollment), 
financial incentives (e.g., matching, tax deductions), and their interactions.   
  
                                                            
main regression specifications with controls for any previous treatment(s).  The results are very similar to our main 
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Figure 2
Automatic Enrollment Enrollment Patterns




Table 1: Full Sample Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean Standard Deviation 
Age 22.669 3.477 
Female 0.151 0.358 
Black 0.221 0.415 
Hispanic 0.157 0.364 
Other race 0.069 0.253 
Married 0.265 0.441 
Children 0.437 0.766 
High school/GED 0.825 0.380 
Some college 0.058 0.234 
Bachelors or more 0.114 0.318 
Enlisted 0.926 0.263 
Officer 0.063 0.244 
Total monthly pay 2917 1294 
Total basic pay 1873 702 
Note.  DOD data.  This table displays the means and 
standard deviations (in parentheses) for the full first-term 









Table 2:  Summary Statistics by Intervention  
Information Email    Action Steps Target Rates   Active Choice  Default Choice 
  Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Age 23.207 23.244 22.774 23.112 22.350 22.330 21.939 21.237 22.723 22.934 
Female 0.153 0.146 0.154 0.149 0.155 0.151 0.143 0.175 0.164 0.163 
Black 0.220 0.213 0.220 0.220 0.219 0.220 0.223 0.177 0.224 0.229 
Hispanic 0.147 0.151 0.151 0.150 0.154 0.158 0.160 0.185 0.179 0.179 
Other race 0.070 0.065 0.072 0.068 0.074 0.070 0.073 0.076 0.063 0.065 
Married 0.288 0.286 0.282 0.287 0.275 0.276 0.266 0.282 0.155 0.156 
Children 0.519 0.515 0.447 0.500 0.394 0.386 0.405 0.274 0.330 0.331 
High 
school/GED 
0.815 0.816 0.817 0.816 0.819 0.823 0.831 0.845 0.860 0.864 
Some 
college 
0.062 0.063 0.059 0.063 0.057 0.058 0.054 0.074 0.045 0.045 
Bachelors 
or more 
0.121 0.118 0.121 0.118 0.121 0.116 0.114 0.080 0.094 0.090 
Enlisted 0.916 0.917 0.916 0.918 0.917 0.920 0.927 0.948 0.969 0.971 
Officer 0.070 0.068 0.069 0.068 0.067 0.066 0.072 0.052 0.031 0.029 




0.07 – 0.63 – 0.33 – – – – – 
Note.  DOD data.  This table displays the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the full samples used in the first-
term servicemember analysis.  The p-values at the bottom of select columns reflect the tests of joint significance of the listed 








Table 3:  Main Effects of Interventions on TSP Participation 
  Information Email 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment 0.0020 0.0041∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.1068∗∗∗ 0.3728∗∗∗ 
  (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0191) (0.0070) 
N 29,361 163,980 135,905 31,906 51,542 
R2  0.0083 0.0091 0.0134 0.0134 0.2112 
Control Group Mean 0.069 0.072 0.076 0.103 0.179 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y 
RCT Y Y Y N N 
Difference in 
Difference N N N Y Y 
P-values for equality of treatment effects 
Information Email – 0.419 0.185 0.000 0.000 
Action Steps  – 0.33 0.000 0.000 
Target Rates   – 0.000 0.000 
Active Choice       – 0.000 
*  p  <  0.10,  **  p  <  0.05,  ***  p  <  0.01.    Estimates  from  column  1  are  pooled  from  two  
separate  RCTs  with  identical informational emails.  Standard errors in Column 1 are clustered 













Table 4:  Main Effects of Interventions on Percentage of Salary Contributed 
  Information Email Action Steps 
Target Rates Active 
Choice 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment 0.0036 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.6136∗∗∗ 
  (0.0169) (0.0111) (0.0149) (0.1245) 
N 29,361 163,980 135,905 31,532 
R2 0.0060 0.0085 0.0153 0.0127 
Control Group Mean 0.488 0.312 0.334 0.218 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
RCT Y Y Y N 
Difference in Difference N N N Y 
P-values for equality of treatment effects         
Information Email –   0.060 0.107 0.000 
Action Steps  – 0.673 0.000 
Target Rates   – 0.000 
Active Choice       – 
*  p < 0.10,  **  p < 0.05,  ***  p < 0.01.   Estimates  from  column  1  are  pooled  from  two  separate  RCTs  









Table 5:  Main Effects of Interventions on Thrift Savings Plan Balance 
  Information Email Action Steps 
Target Rates Active 
Choice 
Default 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment 2.3068 8.8811∗∗∗ 10.9054∗∗∗ 82.6126∗∗∗ 138.2654∗∗∗ 
  (3.4694) (2.3946) (2.8098) (31.0430) (11.7645) 
N 29,357 163,946 135,848 31,884 51,542 
R2   0.0141 0.0183 0.0279 0.0478 0.0598 
Control Group Mean 45.21 48.88 52.47 102.01 70.05 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y 
RCT Y Y Y N N 
Difference in Difference N N N Y Y 
P-values for equality of treatment effects 
Information Email –                           0.044 0.053 0.010 0.000 
Action Steps – 
 
0.583 0.018 0.000 
Target Rates   – 0.021 0.000 
Active Choice       – 0.094 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Estimates from column 1 are pooled from two separate RCTs with identical 












Table 6:  Heterogeneous Treatment Results 
Panel A: Baseline Treatment 
  Young Old Non-White White Female Male Non-Married Married No College Some College+ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Treatment -0.0012 0.0040 -0.0001 0.0026 -0.0021 0.0022 -0.0005 0.0059 -0.0006 0.0107 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0086) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0031) (0.0082) 
N 14,978 14,383 12,712 16,649 4,389 24,972 20,924 8,437 24,026 5,335 
Control Group Mean 0.070 0.067 0.074 0.064 0.089 0.065 0.074 0.054 0.063 0.094 
Panel B: Action Steps 
  Young Old Non-White White Female Male Non-Married Married No College Some College+ 
Treatment 0.0009 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0046 0.0030 0.0067 0.0033∗ 0.0023 0.0071∗∗ 0.0013 0.0152∗∗∗ 
 (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0053) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0051) 
N 87,183 76,797 71,881 92,099 24,524 139,456 117,126 46,854 134,337 29,643 
Control Group Mean 0.073 0.072 0.077 0.069 0.096 0.068 0.077 0.059 0.066 0.102 
Panel C: Rate Prompts 
  Young Old Non-White White Female Male Non-Married Married No College Some College+ 
Treatment 0.0024 0.0128∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗ 0.0050 0.0095 0.0059∗∗ 0.0054∗ 0.0090∗∗ 0.0027 0.0251∗∗∗ 
 (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0067) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0041) (0.0024) (0.0065) 
N 83,565 52,340 60,896 75,009 20,623 115,282 98,452 37,453 112,200 23,705 
Control Group Mean 0.075 0.077 0.079 0.074 0.102 0.071 0.080 0.065 0.069 0.110 
Panel D: Active Choice 
  Young Old Non-White White Female Male Non-Married Married No College Some College+ 
Treatment 0.1063∗∗∗ 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.0811∗∗∗ 0.1280∗∗∗ 0.1920∗∗∗ 0.0895∗∗∗ 0.1196∗∗∗ 0.0716∗∗ 0.0822∗∗∗ 0.2338∗∗∗ 
 (0.0223) (0.0365) (0.0284) (0.0257) (0.0521) (0.0202) (0.0227) (0.0347) (0.0198) (0.0575) 
N 20,413 11,493 14,383 17,523 4,784 27,122 22,435 9,471 25,821 6,085 
Control Group Mean 0.112 0.128 0.122 0.115 0.142 0.114 0.122 0.109 0.105 0.174 
Panel E: Default 
  Young Old Non-White White Female Male Non-Married Married No College Some College+ 
Treatment 0.4123∗∗∗ 0.3104∗∗∗ 0.4042∗∗∗ 0.3473∗∗∗ 0.3036∗∗∗ 0.3859∗∗∗ 0.3801∗∗∗ 0.3334∗∗∗ 0.4023∗∗∗ 0.1947∗∗∗ 
 (0.0087) (0.0118) (0.0102) (0.0097) (0.0170) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0187) (0.0074) (0.0221) 
N 30,417 21,125 24,028 27,514 8,455 43,087 43,561 7,981 44,365 7,177 






Table 7: Cost-Effectiveness Estimates 
Firm N Info Email Action Steps Target Rates Active Choice Auto Enrollment 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
              
Panel A. Thrift Savings Plan Participation ($ Per New Enrollment) 
Small 25 $100,000  $48,780  $28,986  $11  $536  
Medium 750 $3,333  $1,626  $966  $11  $18  
Large 1,000 $2,500  $1,220  $725  $11  $13  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $3  $2  $0.91  $11  $0.02  
              
Panel B. Thrift Savings Plan Cumulative Contributions ($ Per New $ of Contributions) 
Small 25 $87  $23  $18  $0.01  $1  
Medium 750 $3  $1  $1  $0.01  $0.05  
Large 1,000 $2  $1  $0.46  $0.01  $0.04  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $0.003  $0.001  $0.001  $0.01  $0.00005  
              
Note. Author calculations using cost data and program effect estimates from Tables 3 and 4.  We report the 
cost of each new enrollment (Panel A) and the cost of each new dollar of contributions (Panel B) in the TSP 














1. Cost-Effectiveness Method 








Total costs are a function of the fixed and variable costs for each intervention, and the number 
enrolled is the extensive margin program effect (𝛽𝛽𝚥𝚥� ) multiplied by the sample (or firm) size (𝑇𝑇). 
 
A. Light Touch Email Interventions 
As discussed in Section 4, the total costs for the light-touch interventions (i.e., information, actions 
steps, and target contribution rates) were simply the fixed costs of $5,000.  We use this as the total 
costs for our main analysis and consider adding marginal costs (e.g., a per person administrative 
account fee) in robustness checks.  The total costs for these policies is, therefore: 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = $5,000 
The number of individuals who enroll (# 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸) based on each program is the product of the 
causal effect of the program (𝛽𝛽𝚥𝚥� ) and the number of individuals exposed to the treatment (𝑇𝑇).  In 
sensitivity analysis, we add marginal costs to each program, by multiplying the assumed cost by the 
number of enrollees.  Combining these facts, the cost-effectiveness equations are: 























B. Active choice 
We develop a cost model for the active choice intervention.  The total cost of the intervention 








?̂?𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 × 𝑇𝑇 
 
The number of briefings required is dictated by the number of new employees (𝑇𝑇) and the capacity of 
the briefing facilities.  We estimate the number of briefings required for any number of new 
employees by assuming that employers hold monthly sessions (though this is not critical) and use 





25 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 × 𝑇𝑇

















Note that this estimate is constant with respect to the program sample size and the number of new 
enrollees. Firms might differ from our setting in their cost and we conduct sensitivity analysis that 
varies the numerator from $0.60 to $1.80 as depicted in Appendix Table A1. 35 
 
C. Automatic Enrollment 
We estimate the total costs for automatic enrollment based on interviews with several firms providing 
payroll and retirement plan services.36  In our main analysis, we assume that a firm would face a one-
time fixed cost of $5,000 to implement automatic enrollment.  However, these fixed cost estimates 
may be too low for at least two reasons.  First, they reflect estimates from firms with existing plans 
(without automatic enrollment), and a firm implementing a new plan might face costs as much as 
                                                            
34 We assume the briefing was conducted by an individual with paygrade E-6 with greater than 8 years of service at the 
intervention locations (Fort Bragg) which is also one of the Army’s largest and most representative installations. The 
annual salary estimate using DOD pay data is $59,560.  Glassdoor estimates the average salary for “Human Resources” as 
$59,385 (https://www.glassdoor.com/Salaries/human-resources-salary-SRCH_KO0,15.htm accessed August 6, 2019) and 
so the estimates should generalize well, but could adjust to any specific firm’s hourly wage. 
35 We can vary the numerator to account for different briefing costs and/or the capacity of the briefing room.  Cost 
differences could arise due to several factors, including: differing labor costs for the employee conducting the briefing, 
differing marginal costs (e.g., HR personnel have slack in their schedules vs. no slack), or a firm’s need to develop new 
materials (e.g., we assumed no costs for firms with existing materials vs. some that have to develop materials).  Firms 
might also differ in their capacity per briefing based on preferences for session size (e.g., efficient vs. intimate), the 
geographic distribution of new personnel or human resources personnel (e.g., concentrated vs. dispersed), the frequency 
of briefings (e.g., quarterly vs. daily), or the sizes of available of rooms. Table A1 presents our primary assumptions 
(bold) and sensitivity analysis values (italics), which account for many scenarios. 





twenty times higher.37  Second, the costs might not be entirely fixed as an employer might need to 
notify its employees about automatic enrollment.  Such notifications can vary significantly based on 
whether a firm can complete the notifications by email (with a fixed cost around $5,000 for content 
development) or by letter ($1-$2 per employee).  As a result, the total cost and cost-effectiveness 
equations are similar to those for the light-touch interventions:    
 













                                                            






Table A1: Sensitivity Analysis for Active Choice Intervention Costs 
Cost per 
briefing ($) 
Capacity per briefing (number of people) 
2 10 25 50 100 200 
15 7.5 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.15 0.075 
20 10 2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 
25 12.5 2.5 1 0.5 0.25 0.125 
30 15 3 1.20 0.6 0.3 0.15 
35 17.5 3.5 1.4 0.7 0.35 0.175 
40 20 4 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.2 









Table A2: Cost-Effectiveness Estimates for TSP Participation ($ per New Participant) 
Firm N Info Email Action Steps Target Rates Active Choice Auto Enrollment 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
              
Panel A. Baseline Estimates 
Small 25 $100,000  $48,780  $28,986  $11  $536  
Medium 750 $3,333  $1,626  $966  $11  $18  
Large 1,000 $2,500  $1,220  $725  $11  $13  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $3  $2  $0.91  $11  $0.02  
              
Panel B. Reduce Active Choice Ratio from 1.2 to 0.6 
Small 25 $100,000  $48,780  $28,986  $6  $536  
Medium 750 $3,333  $1,626  $966  $6  $18  
Large 1,000 $2,500  $1,220  $725  $6  $13  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $3  $2  $0.91  $6  $0.02  
              
Panel C. Increase Active Choice Ratio from 1.2 to 1.8 
Small 25 $100,000  $48,780  $28,986  $17  $536  
Medium 750 $3,333  $1,626  $966  $17  $18  
Large 1,000 $2,500  $1,220  $725  $17  $13  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $3  $2  $0.91  $17  $0.02  
              
              
Panel D. Add Variable Costs of $30 Per Person to Automatic Enrollment 
Small 25 $100,000  $48,780  $28,986  $11  $566  
Medium 750 $3,333  $1,626  $966  $11  $48  
Large 1,000 $2,500  $1,220  $725  $11  $43  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $3  $2  $0.91  $11  $30  
              
Note. Author calculations using cost data and program effect estimates from Tables 3 and 4.  We report the 
cost of each new enrollment in the TSP for each program (Columns) for firms of various sizes (Rows).  See 








Table A3: Cost-Effectiveness Estimates for TSP Contributions ($ per $ of Contributions) 
Firm N Info Email Action Steps Target Rates Active Choice Auto Enrollment 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
              
Panel A. Baseline Estimates 
Small 25 $87  $23  $18  $0.0145  $1.45  
Medium 750 $3  $1  $1  $0.0145  $0.05  
Large 1,000 $2  $1  $0.46  $0.0145  $0.04  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $0.003  $0.001  $0.001  $0.0145  $0.00005  
              
Panel B. Reduce Active Choice Ratio from 1.2 to 0.6 
Small 25 $87  $23  $18  $0.0073  $1.45  
Medium 750 $3  $1  $1  $0.0073  $0.05  
Large 1,000 $2  $1  $0.46  $0.0073  $0.04  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $0.003  $0.001  $0.001  $0.0073  $0.00005  
              
Panel C. Increase Active Choice Ratio from 1.2 to 1.8 
Small 25 $87  $23  $18  $0.0218  $1.45  
Medium 750 $3  $1  $1  $0.0218  $0.05  
Large 1,000 $2  $1  $0.46  $0.0218  $0.04  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $0.003  $0.001  $0.001  $0.0218  $0.00005  
              
Panel D. Add Variable Costs of $30 Per Person to Automatic Enrollment 
Small 25 $87  $23  $18  $0.0145  $1.45  
Medium 750 $3  $1  $1  $0.0145  $0.058  
Large 1,000 $2  $1  $0.46  $0.0145  $0.046  
Dept of Defense 800,000 $0.003  $0.001  $0.001  $0.0145  $0.010  
              
Note. Author calculations using cost data and program effect estimates from Tables 3 and 4.  We report the cost 
of each new dollar of contributions in the TSP for each program (Columns) for firms of various sizes (Rows).  
See Appendix A for details on our methodology. 
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